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Technological Frames:
Making Sense of Information Technology in Organizations
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we build a theoretical framework to extend research into users' and
designers' cognitions and values by proposing a systematic approach to examining
the underlying assumptions, expectations, and knowledge that people have about
technology. Such interpretations of technology (which we label technological
frames) are central to understanding technological development, use, and change in
organizations as they critically influence the way people act around technology. We
suggest that where the technological frames of key groups in organizations--such as
managers, technologists, and users--are significantly different, difficulties and
conflict around the development, use, and change of technology may result. We use
the findings of an empirical study to illustrate how the nature, value, and use of a
groupware technology were interpreted differently by various organizational
stakeholders, resulting in outcomes that deviated from those expected. We argue
that technological frames offer an interesting and useful analytic perspective for
explaining and anticipating actions and meanings around information technology
that are not easily obtained with other theoretical lenses.
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Some fifteen years ago Bostrom and Heinen (1977) suggested that many of the social
problems associated with the implementation of information systems (IS) were due to the frames of
reference of system designers. Building on this work, Dagwell and Weber (1983) and Kumar and
Bj0rn-Andersen (1990) examined the influence of designers' values and views of users on systems
development, while Boland (1978, 1979) showed that designers' conceptual frameworks
influenced the kind of systems they designed. Ginzberg (1981), in turn, investigated how users'
expectations of a pending information system significantly shaped their attitudes toward it. Since
these studies, researchers have considered designers' and users' perceptions and values as part of
their examination of the social aspects of information technology (Hirschheim and Klein, 1989;
Kling and Iacono, 1989; Markus, 1984).
While a cognitive thread has clearly run through IS research, this has nevertheless not led
to a systematic articulation of the role of frames of reference in systems development and use. In
this paper we hope to lay the groundwork for such a systematic approach to social cognitions
around information technology. We argue that an understanding of people's interpretations of a
technology is critical to understanding their interaction with it. To interact with technology, people
have to make sense of it. And in this sensemaking process, people develop particular assumptions,
expectations, and knowledge of the technology, which then serve to shape their subsequent action
towards it. While these interpretations of technology become taken-for-granted and are rarely
surfaced and reflected on, they nevertheless remain particularly significant in influencing how
actors in organizations think about and act towards technology. Weick (1990:17), for example, has
noted: "cognition and micro-level processes are keys to understanding the organizational impact of
new technologies."
In this paper, we argue that by examining key actors' taken-for-granted notions of
technology, we can gain much insight into how technologies are developed, used, and changed in
organizations. We propose a conceptual framework for examining the interpretations that people
develop around technology, which should be useful for researchers studying the role of technology
in organizations, as well as for practitioners managing the implementation of technological change.
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In the first section below, we discuss the social cognitive research on frames of reference
or cognitive structures that are shared among groups of individuals. We build on this work to
develop the concept of technological frames which focuses attention on those aspects of shared
cognitive structures that concern technology. We suggest that different groups within an
organization may have different technological frames, and introduce the notion of congruence to
describe the nature and extent of difference among frames. We then draw on some findings from a
field study that analyzed the implementation and early use of a new information technology to
examine key actors' interpretations of the technology. The findings reveal significant differences in
the technological frames of two primary groups of actors--technologists and users. The
incongruence in frames provides an interesting explanation of the difficulties and unanticipated
outcomes that were associated with the technology implementation. We conclude by discussing the
power of the technological frames concept in research and practice.
THE CONCEPT OF FRAMES
A major premise of social cognitive research is that people act on the basis of their
interpretations of the world, and in doing so they enact particular social realities and endow them
with meaning (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Smircich and Stubbart 1985; Weick 1979a). The
frames of reference of organizational members are implicit guidelines that organize and shape their
interpretations of events' and organizational phenomena and give them meaning (Moch and
Bartunek, 1990; Weick 1979b). Borrowing from the concept of "schema" in cognitive psychology
(Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1976), an individual's frame of reference has been described as "a built-
up repertoire of tacit knowledge that is used to impose structure upon, and impart meaning to,
otherwise ambiguous social and situational information to facilitate understanding" (Gioia,
1986:56). Recent literature in organizational behavior has extended the idea of individual cognitive
structures and extended it to groups and organizations (Calder and Schurr, 1981; Gray, Bougon
and Donnellon, 1985). A variety of terms has been used to convey this idea of shared cognitive
structures, including "cognitive maps" (Bougon, Weick, and Binkhorst, 1977; Eden, 1992),
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"frames" (Goffman, 1974), "interpretive frames" (Bartunek and Moch, 1987), "interpretative
schemes" (Giddens, 1984), "mental models" (Schutz, 1970; Argyris and Schon, 1978),
"paradigms" (Kuhn, 1970; Sheldon, 1980), "scripts" (Abelson, 1981; Gioia, 1986), and "thought
worlds" (Douglas, 1987; Dougherty, 1992). 1
While some of these terms (e.g., mental model, frame, and script), have been used in
cognitive science and artificial intelligence, their usage here reflects our interest in how
organizational members make sense of and assign meaning to their environment, organization, and
tasks (e.g., Daft and Weick, 1984; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Porac
and Thomas, 1990). Frames refer to people's "definitions of organizational reality that serve as
vehicles for understanding and action" (Gioia, 1986:50). They include assumptions, knowledge,
and expectations, expressed symbolically through language, visual images, metaphors, and
stories. Frames are flexible in structure and content, having variable dimensions that shift in
salience and content by context and over time. They are structured more as webs of meanings than
as linear, ordered graphs (Gioia, 1986).
By shaping individuals' interpretations of organizational phenomena, frames implicitly
guide individuals to make sense of and take action in organizations (Bartunek, 1984; Moch and
Bartunek, 1990). They typically operate in the background and have both facilitating and
constraining effects. On the one hand, as Gioia (1986:346) notes, frames are facilitative when they:
structure organizational experience; allow interpretation of ambiguous situations; reduce uncertainty
in conditions of complexity and changing conditions; and provide a basis for taking action. For
example, research paradigms facilitate the practice and communication of a community of scholars
by providing shared assumptions about the nature of phenomena, a vocabulary for representing
such phenomena, and criteria for evaluating scholarly work. On the other hand, however, frames
are also constraining when they: reinforce unreflective reliance on established assumptions and
knowledge; distort information to make it fit existing cognitive structures; and inhibit creative
problem solving. For example, Starbuck (1989) shows how the executives of the Facit AB
1 We will use the term "frames" in this paper to refer to this general concept of shared cognitive structures.
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calculator company were so convinced of the superiority of their mechanical calculators, that they
could not acknowledge the real threat posed by new electronic calculators until it was too late and
the company was on the brink of failure. As Bolman and Deal (1991:4) point out, frames can
create "psychic prisons" that inhibit learning because people "cannot look at old problems in a new
light and attack old challenges with different and more powerful tools - they cannot reframe."
Sharing of Frames
The social cognitive perspective suggests that while members of a particular community
have individual interpretations, they also tend have a set of core beliefs in common (Porac, Thomas
and Baden-Fuller, 1989). Professional/occupational training and socialization may be seen as an
attempt by members of a community to transmit the use of particular cognitive schemas to others,
especially new members (Tolbert, 1988; Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). This literature
acknowledges the strong effect of group or community membership, which influences the
particular systems of knowledge, meaning, beliefs, and norms to which members are exposed, and
creates differences in interests and orientations among communities (Dougherty, 1992; Gregory,
1983; Schutz, 1964; Shibutani, 1962; Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). The research on social
information processing (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), power (Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer 1980),
specialization (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Daft and Lengel, 1984; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969), and
organizational cultures (Gregory, 1983; Riley, 1983; Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 1985; Strauss,
1978) further suggests that people tend to share assumptions, knowledge, and expectations with
others with whom they have close working relationships. Likewise, social interaction and
negotiation over time create opportunities for the development and exchange of similar points of
view (Gray, Bougon and Donnellon, 1985; Isabella, 1990).
A shared frame can take different forms. Weick and Bougon (1986:112), for example,
suggest three: an assemblage that ties individual frames together through common dimensions; a
composite which is formed by group members jointly constructing a common understanding
through discussion; and an average which represents the intersection of individuals' frames
4
comprising the group. Our view of shared frames borrows from Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of
family resemblances, where individuals can be said to share a frame if some core cognitive
elements (assumptions, knowledge, and expectations) are similar. 2 Thus, we recognize that while
frames are necessarily individually held and hence inevitably reflect individual variation, it is
nonetheless useful to distinguish those cognitive elements that--through socialization, interaction,
or negotiation--individuals have in common. It is these collective cognitive elements that
individuals draw on to construct and reconstruct their social reality.
While the concept of shared frames is closely related to that of subcultures, it should not be
confused with it. Frames are cognitive structures or mental models that are held by individuals.
Frames are assumed to be shared by a number of individuals when there is a significant overlap of
cognitive categories and content. The concept of subcultures, on the other hand, is not purely
cognitive, but refers to the "living historical product of group problem solving" (Van Maanen and
Barley, 1985:33). Subcultures are posited to be enacted realities. That is, individuals -- drawing on
their shared frames -- engage in symbolic action and thereby construct a social reality that reflects
their common assumptions, beliefs, and understandings, and that includes particular rules, rituals,
and customary practices. Thus, while subcultures rely heavily on cognitive elements such as
common frames of reference, they are not equivalent (Geertz, 1973; Van Maanen and Barley,
1985). Where cultural and subcultural analyses provide interpretations of contexts -- socially
established webs of meaning and actions -- frames of reference offer a crisp and powerful lens for
focusing specifically on how people make sense of particular aspects of the world.
Technological Frames
To the extent that technology constitutes a core element in organizations, aspects of
members' organizational frames will concern technology. Most discussions of social cognition do
not specifically address technology per se, emphasizing instead strategy, innovation, or change
management. We think it is useful, at least analytically, to focus on the particular interpretations
2 Thanks are due to Dick Boland for suggesting this application.
5
made about technology and its role in organizations. We use the term technological frame to
identify that subset of members' organizational frames that concern the assumptions, expectations,
and knowledge they use to understand technology in organizations. This includes not only the
nature and role of the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and consequences
of that technology in particular contexts of use.
A few researchers have proposed the idea that individuals have assumptions and
expectations about technology (Bostrom and Heinen, 1977; Ginzberg 1981; Goodman, Griffith
and Fenner, 1990), and we want to expand on these ideas, emphasizing in particular the social
nature of technological frames, their specific content, and their implications for technology
development, implementation, and use. While the concept of technological frames is rooted in
social cognitive research, we have also drawn on the sociological literature that examines collective
cognitions and social constructions of technology (Bijker, 1987; Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987;
Henderson, 1991; Satnan, 1991). In this literature, technology frames are the understandings that
members of a social group come to have of particular technological artifacts, and they include not
only knowledge about the particular technology in question, but also local understanding of
specific uses in a given setting. This contextual dimension of frames is one we wish to preserve in
our treatment of technological frames as it is particularly significant. For example, Bloomberg
(1986) shows how users' perspective of a technology influenced and shaped the way in which it
was embedded into their work process. As she notes (1986:42), the meaning of a technology "can
only be described and its significance appreciated in the context of its uses and its users." We thus
include the contexts of design and use along with the artifact itself as formative aspects of
technological frames.
Technological frames have powerful effects in that people's assumptions, expectations, and
knowledge about the purpose, context, importance, and role of technology will strongly influence
the choices made regarding the design and use of those technologies (Noble, 1986; Pinch and
Bijker, 1987; Orlikowski, 1992a). Because technologies are social artifacts, their material form and
function will embody their sponsors' and developers' objectives, values, interests, and knowledge
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regarding that technology. For example, views of how work should be done, what the division of
labor should be, how much autonomy employees should have, and how integrated or decoupled
production units should be, are all assumptions that are consciously or implicitly built into
information technology by systems planners and designers (Boland, 1979; Hirschheim and Klein,
1989; Orlikowski, 1992a). Time too, affects the possibility of interpretation, both for the
organization--where understandings of process and product technology rapidly congeal after
implementation (Tyre and Orlikowski, forthcoming)--and for society (Winner, 1986), where, as
Pfaffenberger (1988:16) notes:
Once created, however, the opportunity for social choice diminishes. An implemented
technology carries with it a powerful vision of the society in which it is to be used, replete with
an equally powerful endowment of symbolic meaning and, sometimes, an obligatory plan for
the way people will have to arrange themselves to use it.
Congruence of Technological Frames
Pinch and Bijker (1987) argue that because technological artifacts may be interpreted
differently by multiple social groups, different social groups will construct different interpretations
of the technology based on their interactions with it. Such interpretations, to varying degrees, are
shaped and constrained by various groups' purpose, context, power, knowledge base, and the
artifact itself. For example, automobile designers may be seen to have different notions and
knowledge of automobiles than drivers, who in turn have different interpretations to mechanics,
and so on. With respect to information technology in organizations, there are usually a number of
critical social groups--in what Kling and Gerson (1978) refer to as the social world of computing--
whose actions will significantly influence the process and outcome of technological change.
Managers, system developers, and users, at a minimum, will be key actors and by dint of their
membership in particular social groups and the different roles and relationships they have with
technology, they will tend to share their group's technological frame about information technology.
Such group frames are unlikely to be shared across the different stakeholder groups (Calder
and Schurr, 1981). For example, technologists may be expected to have an engineering perspective
on technology, treating it as a tool to be designed, manipulated, and deployed to accomplish a
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particular task (Orlikowski, 1988; Markus and Bj0rn-Andersen, 1987). In contrast, line managers
may have a more strategic understanding of technology, expecting it to facilitate certain ways of
doing business and providing financial returns, while users may take a more focused or
instrumental view of technology, expecting immediate, local, and task-specific benefits from using
technology to accomplish daily work.
We define the notion of congruence in technological frames as referring to the alignment of
frames on key elements or categories. By congruent, we do not mean identical, but related in
structure (i.e., common categories of frames) and content (i.e., similar values on the common
categories). The notion is akin to that of cognitive consensuality (Gioia and Sims, 1986; Isabella,
1990), which Finney and Mitroff (1986:320) define as "a reasonable amount of implicit agreement
among organization members as to the appropriate meaning of information or events." Congruence
in technological frames would imply, for example, similar expectations around the role of
technology in business processes, the nature of technological use, or the type and frequency of
support and maintenance. Incongruence in technological frames implies important differences in
expectations, assumptions, or knowledge about some key aspects of the technology. For example,
a frame incongruence is apparent when managers expect a technology to transform the way their
company does business, but users believe the technology is intended to merely speed up and
control their work. Alternatively, incongruence may occur when technologists have a different
understanding of and experience with a particular technology--say a database system, which they
believe is highly malleable and customizable--to that of users who only experience a single
structured interface, and hence believe the database system is inflexible and standardized.
We expect that where incongruent technological frames exist, organizations are likely to
experience difficulties and conflicts around developing, implementing, and using technologies. For
example, one of us observed significant frame incongruence between some organizational
members who were participating in design sessions which they believed would create some minor
changes to their existing technology, and the consultants who understood their mandate as
developing new technology around a reengineered work process. The result was a serious
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breakdown in communication, a lack of participation by users in the design process, and the
eventual suspension of the project. Another example is given by Zuboff's (1988) case studies
where managers were unable to accept information technology that would increase workers'
autonomy and decision-making authority. The managers' frames were so rooted in traditional ideas
of managerial authority that they could not "wrest themselves from deep-seated images of
managerial control" (1988:278), hence creating substantial incongruence between managers' and
users' interpretation of the same technology. Managers would not acknowledge that operators'
jobs had changed significantly as a result of information technology use, while the operators--
experiencing the technological change--perceived a fundamental shift in their tasks, norms, and
responsibilities. These frame conflicts soon led to social clashes around worker grievances and
union action.
While we are most interested in the incongruence of frames across groups as we believe
that different worldviews are likely to be very important in influencing social relations, we also
note that frames may be internally inconsistent. That is, while frames are typically self-reinforcing,
even to the point of rejecting knowledge that does not fit their system of meaning (Dougherty,
1992), they may also embody ideas that are ambiguous, obsolete, incomplete, or incorrect. Such
inconsistencies within a group's frame are largely implicit, yet they often have important
consequences For example, group members may believe that a new conferencing technology will
increase their collaboration and productivity within the group, while at the same time they may not
expect personally to have to type in substantial amounts of commentary, expecting everyone else to
contribute. In this case, members are likely to promote group conferencing publicly, but not make
any changes in their individual work habits to facilitate collaborative use of the technology.
In order to explore the concept of technological frames in more detail and provide a
concrete illustration of its application and value, we now present some findings from an empirical
study conducted by one of us. Our main interest in discussing these findings is to demonstrate the
explanatory power of the technological frames concept, not to discuss the research study in full.3
3 For more details on the study see Orlikowski (1992b)
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The research study investigated the implementation of a new information technology--a
groupware system--into one large organization. The research included a focus on how different
actors in the organization made sense of the new technology and how and why they interacted with
it. Technological frames of the technologists and users were identified and found to be incongruent
in a number of ways. This incongruence led to some incompatible actions around the technology
which made the groupware implementation more difficult than had been anticipated. Before
presenting and discussing these findings, we first describe the research site and methods used.
RESEARCH STUDY
Research Site and Methods
The field study was conducted within a large professional services firm, Alpha Corporation
(a pseudonym), which provides consulting services to clients around the world. With offices in
hundreds of cities, Alpha employs more than 10,000 employees. As with other professional
organizations such as law and accounting firms, Alpha has a matrix structure, operating at the
decentralized office level through local project teams, yet centrally coordinated through policies set
by its Headquarters. One of the most influential of these policies is the strict "up or out" career
structure which controls progress of all consultants via four primary milestones--staff consultant,
senior consultant, manager, and principal. In addition to the practice offices and its Headquarters
office, Alpha has a separate Technology office which sets corporate technology standards and
supports the firm's technological infrastructure.
A few years ago, Alpha purchased and distributed a groupware product--the Notes system
from Lotus Development Corporation4--to all their consultants and support staff as part of a
strategy, described by a senior principal as an attempt to "leverage the expertise of our firm." The
research described here focused on the implementation of Notes over a five-month period in one
large office of Alpha.s It investigated how the groupware technology was understood and acted
4 Notes is an integrated working environment that supports communication, coordination, and collaboration through
such features as electronic mail, computer conferences, shared databases, and customized views. See DeJean and
DeJean (1991) and Marshak (1990) for more details on the product.
5 henceforth referred to simply as "the office."
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on, both by the technologists responsible for its implementation and by the consultants adopting its
use. The research study began in February 1991 before the Notes system was due to be installed
within the office and continued through its implementation and early use (June 1991). About five
weeks were spent investigating the work processes and communication patterns before Notes was
installed, and the rest of the time focused on the users attempts to learn, assimilate, and use the
new technology. The findings reflect participants' anticipations of as well as their early exposure to
the Notes system. While these findings only reflect the adoption and early use experiences with a
particular technology, they are revealing as they highlight people's initial sense-making of a new
technology in light of their existing cognitive structures and current work practices. Research by
Tyre and Orlikowski (forthcoming) suggests that early interpretations of a technology are
particularly influential because they get established rapidly as the technology is assimilated into
work practices and becomes built into organizational routines and work habits. Such embedded
understandings and assessments of a technology are particularly difficult to change later.
A qualitative approach was used to collect and analyze the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles
and Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1989). Detailed data collection was conducted through unstructured
interviews, review of materials, and observations in the field. Over ninety interviews were
conducted, each about an hour in length, during which detailed notes were taken. In addition to the
office where the study was conducted, key actors in Alpha's headquarters and technology offices
were interviewed. Participants spanned all four of the firm's hierarchical levels and many of the
functional groupings, including consultants in active practice, administrators facilitating practice
activities, and technologists providing centralized technology support (see Table 1). Materials
reviewed included firm documents such as annual reports and promotional material (used to obtain
background information on the firm's size and business), project information such as working
papers and schedules, and training materials such as manuals and a video on the Notes technology.
Observations of meetings, training classes, and individuals at work were also made throughout the
study. The field notes from these observations were used to verify or elaborate the interview data.
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Table 1: Number and Type of Interviews in Alpha
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CONSULTANTS TECHNOLOGISTS TOTAL
Principals 13 4 17
Managers 26 15 41
Seniors 12 13 25
Administrators 8 -- 8
TOTAL 59 32 9 1
iii ii iiii1 i i I
In addition, access to the Notes technology itself was available through a dial-up connection to the
office server, allowing database usage to be observed during the time of the study.
The qualitative approach facilitated an analysis of different actors' interpretations of the new
technology and their actions around it. The data were first separated into groups -- whether they
reflected statements or actions of consultants, managers, and technologists. Then for each of these
groups, interview transcripts and field notes were examined to identify statements or actions that
reflected assumptions, knowledge, or expectations of the Notes technology and its implications for
work and the firm's operations as a whole. This examination used a form of content analysis
where the data are read and sorted into categories that are suggested by the data rather than imposed
from outside (Agar, 1980:104). Once all the data were examined for each group, cross-group
analysis then followed, which consisted of comparing the categories generated by each group's
data to determine whether they reflected common themes or patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989:540). Once
these themes were identified, the data of each group were re-examined and re-coded using the
proposed themes, the goal being to determine that set of themes and categories that covered as
much of the data as possible. This iterative examination yielded a set of themes which were posited
to constitute core domains of the participants' technological frames. These domains were then
inspected for similarities and differences across functions (consultancy versus technical support)
and hierarchical levels (e.g., consultant versus manager, technology specialist versus technology
manager). While there appeared to be some frame differences due to hierarchy, the most significant
differences were evident between technologists and users. These differences in technological frame
domains are discussed below.
Research Findings
Three domains were found to characterize the interpretations that participants made about
the Notes technology and its role in Alpha and their work:
(i) Nature of Technology, which refers to people's images of the technology and their
understanding of its capabilities and functionality.
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(ii) Technology Strategy, which refers to people's views of why their organization acquired
and implemented the technology. It includes their understanding of the motivation or vision
behind the adoption decision, and its likely value to the organization.
(iii) Technology-in-Use, which refers to people's understanding of how the technology will be
used on a day-to-day basis, and the likely or actual conditions and consequences associated
with such use.
These frame domains were derived from a specific empirical setting. It is interesting to
contrast these to the set of categories we had derived earlier, a priori, by examining the literature on
systems development and IS impacts (Orlikowski and Gash, 1991). That attempt had yielded a
larger set of categories (seven), each of which was quite broad, for example, "Relations with other
players in the social world of computing" included the relationships and interactions that
individuals have with other social groups around information technology such as managers, users,
technologists, vendors, consultants, customers, and government regulators. Of the seven, only
two appeared in the Alpha data "issues around use" (which related to the "technology-in-use"
domain) and "criteria of success" (which was part of the "technology strategy" domain). It is
perhaps not surprising that in our inductive approach to the empirical data we derived categories
that were much more context-specific than those we had identified from the literature. This contrast
does, however, substantiate the view expressed earlier, that frames are likely to be time- and
context-dependent, and are always more valid when examined in situ rather than assumed ahead of
time.
The frame domains that emerged from the Alpha data embody understandings that, simply
stated, reflect what the technology is (nature of technology), why it was introduced (technology
strategy), and how it is used to create various changes in work (technology-in-use). The three
domains clearly interact and are overlapping, and we do not believe they are independent. For
purposes of discussion, however, we find it useful to analytically distinguish among them,
particularly as such a distinction highlights the relevant differences between the technologists' and
the users' interpretations of the technology.
The grouping of "technologists" here includes the Chief Information Officer (CIO) who
heads Alpha's Technology function, and some 40 people who report to him. Most of these
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technologists have technical backgrounds, having worked as programmers and computer support
staff for most of their careers. The CIO is a principal of the firm, having being hired into this
position a few years ago from a senior technical position outside the firm. The people who work
for him are not considered consultants, being treated instead as regular salaried employees and not
subjected to the lock-step timing and risk associated with the professional consulting career path.
The grouping of "users" here includes consultants at all levels (from staff consultant
through to principal) as well as administrative support staff such as secretaries. Contrary to initial
expectations, there were no substantial differences between consultants' and managers'
technological frames. At least two reasons appear to account for this. The first is that in Alpha the
technology was purchased and installed by the technologists, after they received approval from the
chairman of the corporation. No other principal or manager was involved in the investment
decision, and hence the only exposure that executives at Alpha had to the Notes technology was as
users of it. Two, the distinction between workers and managers is much less marked in
professional firms than in other organizations, because all employees are considered professionals.
While distinctions are still made among professionals on the basis of experience, expertise, tenure,
and influence, the users in Alpha (staff and senior consultants) are all aspiring managers and
principals, and are actively being socialized into thinking and acting like them. The result is a more
homogenous mindset among the various ranks of professionals than might be found in other kinds
of organizations.
Technological Frames of the Technologists
In discussing the interpretations of the Alpha technologists around the Notes technology,
we consider in turn each of the three domains outlined above: nature of technology, technology
strategy, and technology-in-use.
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Nature of Technology
Technologists learned of the Notes technology when they were searching for a standard
communication technology that would facilitate electronic communication both within and across
offices. At the time, such a capability did not exist within Alpha, either corporate-wide or at the
local levels. 6 A few weeks after having purchased an electronic mail system, the CIO was shown
the Lotus Notes system and was very impressed. He noted:
I got a demo copy of it [Notes] and I thought it was dynamite. I knew in an hour that it was a
breakthrough product, a revolution. I played with it for just two days and was really impressed.
Having examined Notes, the CIO was persuaded that not only did it have the functionality to match
the firm's communication requirements, it also had the capability to facilitate electronic
conferencing and the sharing of databases. He believed that this advanced capability would address
another of Alpha's requirements, that of eliminating "reinvention of the wheel" throughout the
firm. Consultants in different offices often worked on similar client problems without sharing
knowledge, approaches, or solutions. Thus they did not typically leverage the existing expertise in
the firm. Reversing his decision to acquire simply an electronic mail system, the CIO quickly
obtained approval to establish Notes as the standard communication and information sharing
platform in the firm. He recollected:
So I went to [my boss] and said, "We have an opportunity of a lifetime to get involved with a
wonderful product. ... I think it's an extraordinary technology." [My boss] said "It sounds good to me."
Having purchased thousands of copies of Notes for the firm's consultants, the CIO ordered his
staff to install it (and the necessary supporting technology -- hardware, networks, and servers) as
soon as possible in all offices of the firm. He explained his rapid implementation strategy this way:
Our strategy was to blast Notes through our organization as quickly as possible, with no prototypes,
no pilots, no lengthy technical evaluation.... We realized Notes was a transformation technology. Our
traditional implementation of technology was "creeping technology" -- to give it to the technology
guys, have them run a pilot, watch special groups use it, monitor and evaluate their usage, then roll it
out phase by phase. But if you believe that Notes is a competitive technology you have to deploy it
quickly, and put it in the hands of the users as fast as possible. Critical mass is key.
On a subsequent occasion, he reiterated his belief that critical mass was the most important factor in
the Notes implementation plan:
6 Certain groups within a few offices had set up their own local area networks and installed electronic mail systems
on them, but these were largely stand-alone and incompatible endeavors.
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The value of the technology [Notes] is proportional to the number of users. So the faster we could get
to critical mass, the sooner people would use it.
Initially, the CIO's staff were somewhat less enthusiastic about the Notes product, being
concerned about the potential complexity of the technical infrastructure, and the CIO's demands for
a rapid deployment. One technology manager commented:
We had no time to do a formal plan or a grand strategy because [the CIO] had raised the level of
enthusiasm in the firm, and there was no way we could say to the principals "wait while we get our act
together."
However, as these technologists began to install the product on thousands of consultants'
workstations across the country--implementing an office a week in what they termed "SWAT
team" fashion--they began to share the CIO's assessments of the product as substantially different
from conventional electronic communication systems. One senior technologist observed:
I first saw it [Notes] as an email product. I didn't see the grand scope of the product."
while another commented that, initially, "I hated it. I didn't appreciate the potential of the
software," but that he had since "seen its value for the firm." A technology manager further
observed that while the implementation had been accomplished with "a lot of fear and trepidation,"
they had also realized that:
We couldn't give up, even though there were many times we wished we could. But we had to make it
work, we had no choice. ... So we got to see it as a challenge, and it became exciting. And now we've
really accomplished something in two years.
Many of the technologists' interpretations and actions around Notes reflected an assessment
of the technology that emphasized its technical capabilities without reference to an organizational
context or to a specific business use, as in the general references to "a breakthrough product," "an
extraordinary technology," and "transformation technology." That is, the technologists were
caught up in the advanced capabilities of the technology, rather than on its role as a means to some
specific organizational end. This and the assumption that the nature of the technology and its
potential value were obvious lead the technologists to suppose that the Notes technology did not
require much justification, assessment, or trial. This is evident in: (i) their assumption that a
feasibility analysis of Notes was not necessary, and hence their action in not conducting such an
analysis; (ii) their decision not to follow a formal implementation plan, and hence their rapid and
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broad deployment of the Notes technology; and (iii) their assumption that once there were
sufficient numbers of people connected to the network (critical mass), use would follow.
Technology Strategy
Technologists had a clear and somewhat broad vision of what the Notes technology could
bring to the firm. Essentially removed from the day-to-day pressures of practice work, the
technologists couched the rationale and motivation for Notes in conceptual and non-specific terms.
For example, the CIO, the primary driver behind the Notes acquisition, offered a general vision of
what Notes would do for Alpha:
Notes is capable of changing the culture of our firm, of enabling a view of technology that changes
how we share information and deliver client service.
He reiterated this view on various occasions, for example,
Notes gives us a competitive advantage by transforming the way the firm does business.
This assumption was generally accepted by many of the technologists, as one manager echoed:
We want to transform the way we deliver service to clients.
What such changes would mean for the work, structure, and culture of the firm, or how they
would be enacted, were not specifically articulated.
In addition to the motivation behind a technology's adoption, another indicator of peoples'
interpretation of a technology's strategy is their view of which success criteria to use in evaluating
the technology. When asked how they would assess the effectiveness of Notes within Alpha,
technologists tended to employ technical criteria of success citing measures related to the
deployment and operation of the Notes technology, rather than its business impact. For example,
the CIO explained:
One measure of success is that we have 6000 users and 100 servers worldwide. And the number of
applications is our other measure of success. We currently have about 200 databases.
Other technology managers had similar reactions, observing:
Indicators of success? That we need to add resources. We now need more horsepower because usage and
volume have increased. For example, when we installed a fax gateway, our fax load tripled in 2 days.
We have no formal measurement of Notes ... We've deployed 7000 copies in two years. I think we
have done very well.
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Comparing these two domains of technology strategy -- motivation for the technology and criteria
of its success -- some inconsistency in the technologists' assumptions and expectations is apparent.
On the one hand, technologists have a view of technology that envisions it producing business
changes by transforming the firm. On the other hand, however, they evaluate the success of that
technology through technical measures, without an assessment of business performance, work
practices, or client service. The latter focus on technical measures likely reflects the way in which
the firm evaluates the performance of the technologists. Seen as technical problem-solvers,
technologists are often assessed on the performance of the technology, not that of the business.
Thus, an inconsistency appears to exist between the (technical) success criteria technologists
employ as part of their organizational role, and their (business) vision of the technology's value for
the firm. Such internal frame inconsistencies often occur where frames are not articulated and
reflected on.
Technologyv-in-Use
An important aspect of using technology is knowing enough about it so as to appropriate
and manipulate it effectively. Such knowledge is usually acquired through education and training.
During the Notes installation in Alpha, the technologists decided to minimize the amount of
education, training, and support they would provide to users. Their decision was influenced by
four assumptions they made about: (i) their priorities and resources; (ii) the users' interest in
training and application development; (iii) the ease-of-use of the technology; and (iv) the adequacy
of existing policies and procedures around security, confidentiality, and quality.
First, technologists assumed that their first priority was getting the Notes system up and
running across the firm. Because they had limited resources (staff, time, and money), they
consequently believed they had to trade off spending these resources on education or spending
them on rolling out the technology. They chose to focus on the latter, as the CIO explained:
[The technologists'] focus in life is to keep it [Notes] going. It can never fail. So they are purely
focused on the technical implementation. That's the right mental model for them.
A technology manager likewise commented:
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We made a conscious decision between whether we should throw it [Notes] to the users versus
spending a lot of time training. We decided on the former.
Second, the technologists assumed that consultants were busy professionals who would
object to spending time on education and avoid attending training courses. Two technologists said:
They [the consultants] don't see training as important. They see it as a pain.
The professionals want to take a pill and just learn it [Notes]. They don't want to spend the time and effort.
The lack of emphasis on training was consistent with the CIO's view that it is through use and
experimentation, not formal education or extensive support that people begin to appreciate a
technology's potential and learn to apply it in different and interesting ways. He remarked:
The philosophy behind our implementation is that we see it [Notes] as an empowering tool. We put it
in, build a small number of applications, sow the seeds, and see what happens. The development is
self-justifying.
On two other occasions, he observed similarly,
We allowed an uncontrolled development environment to flourish. This is a tool for the masses, so we
said "do what you like." ... If the technology is compelling enough, they [the users] will drift into
new ways of doing things.
People are smart, they'll figure out what to do.
This view was echoed by many of the technologists, as one technology manager noted:
We expected decentralized application development. We're trying to provide some centralized direction,
but we don't want to dampen creativity.
Third, the technologists assumed--on the basis of their experience with the technology and
the way the technology was being marketed by its vendor--that the Notes technology was an "end
user" tool and hence that it could be learned and used by the consultants with relative ease. For
example, two senior technologists observed:
Notes does not require formal end user training. So we minimized training to reduce the period of
trial. We didn't want them [the users] to think they had to learn to use Notes.
Application development is so easy, the average Joe can build his own applications.
while their manager noted that,
Notes is so intuitive that you can get a feel for it within minutes, even people who haven't used
computers before.
Evident in these technologists' interpretations is their view of the user, which on close inspection
appears somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, users are portrayed by technologists as "smart,"
hence as requiring minimal training and support. The videotape developed by the technologists and
supplied to each office was intended to be viewed by consultants on their own. Both the tape and
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its accompanying work book are focused almost entirely on the mechanics of using Notes. For
example, the work book includes the following sections: "Database Views and Windows,"
"Additional Basic Features," and "Using Notes Mail." The assumption is that users will "figure
out" how to apply the technology to their own work. As one technologist noted in exasperation
over a request for extra support by users:
At some point these individuals have got to take some responsibility for finding things out for
themselves.... But they just want to be spoonfed. They expect us to do everything. We feel they
should meet us halfway but they don't think so.
On the other hand, users are patronized or made fun of, as evident for example, in the
database a technologist had created of users waiting to receive Notes, which he labeled "rollout
victims," and in the remarks offered by some technologists on why they do not teach application
development in Notes training classes:
Once users start creating their own applications, they go nuts. So we have to stop them before they do
damage.
We worry about the quality of applications designed by such people, and the inappropriate format,
standards, etc. of things that may be created, shared, and used.
On another occasion, a technologist amused his colleagues with stories of users' struggles with
technology -- recounting for example, the hands-on computer demonstration some principals were
receiving, and how one of them picked the mouse up off the pad and tried to use it by pointing it at
the screen as if it were a remote control device. Such stereotypical views of users are not
uncommon in IS departments.
Fourth, the technologists assumed that the new technology did not pose any new issues
with respect to security, confidentiality, and data quality. The CIO commented:
The privacy and security issues are decided by the owners of the databases [the users]. We have a
relatively open environment in the firm, so we leave privacy and security up to the local people. We
trust them. ... Client confidentiality is a cultural value for our firm, so those norms will be extended to
Notes. Notes does not raise any new issues.
Likewise a senior technology manager noted:
I don't get a sense from the users that they care about security. We also didn't get a sense from Lotus
that other companies were concerned about security.
With respect to control over the quality of data that would be entered into Notes, the CIO noted:
The issue of obsolete data quality? As Notes--we're a common carrier--we make no guarantees about
data quality. As for the problem of obsolescence, if they [the users] don't know it by now it is not my
job to tell them. These are not new issues. We have the same issues with paper. You must understand
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that this is a professional services firm where we have a standard of conduct and procedures which are
well-established in our practice ... This is a firm whose success is based on multiple reviews. So
procedures already exist for ensuring that information is checked and reviewed.
The technologists' frame of Notes-in-use -- that it is easy to use, easy to create new
applications on it, and does not raise new issues of security or confidentiality -- is reflected in their
own use of Notes. As was evident from the activity on the Notes system, the technologists were
active users of various discussion databases they had created, such as "Anti-Virus Discussions"
and "Hardware and Software Support." Many technologists frequently accessed and contributed to
these databases, sharing information about technical problems, solutions, trouble-shooting, and
new or upgraded products.
Technological Frames of the Users
As in the discussion of technologists' frames, the discussion of users' interpretations of
the Notes technology will consider in turn each of the three domains outlined earlier: nature of
technology, technology strategy, and technology-in-use.
Nature of Technology
The users in this study received little official information about the Notes product, or the
rationale behind its wide-scale implementation. When they were interviewed a few weeks before
Notes was to be installed in their office (about a year after the firm had purchased the technology),
some users had limited knowledge of the technology, as evident in these comments:
With respect to Notes, I know nothing about it. I don't know what it is supposed to do and I don't
know when I am supposed to get it. So I have no expectations about it.
I first heard that the firm had bought Notes through the Wall Street Journal. Then your study was the
next mention of it. That's all I know about it.
I heard about Notes at the [managers' seminar] about eight months ago. I still don't know what it is.
Other users had some ideas about the technology, but these were either only partially correct, or
somewhat incomplete, for example:
I believe Notes is putting word processing power into spreadsheets.
Is it a new version of 1-2-3?
It's the great file in the sky.
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It's a database housed somewhere in the center of the universe.
I understand that it makes your work environment paperless. It's like taking all your files--your library
of information in your office--and putting it on the computer.
It has something to do with communications.
It's big email.
I've heard that it's hard copy of email ... but I am not very clear about what it is exactly.
Research in cognitive sociology (Cicourel, 1974; Goffman, 1974) and organizational
studies (Van Maanen, 1984; Weick, 1979a) suggests that people tend to approach the new in terms
of the old. The same may be expected of people confronting new technology. In the absence of
other information, they will attempt to interpret it in terms of their existing technological frames,
imposing assumptions, knowledge, and expectations about familiar technology on the unfamiliar
technology. This is evident in the above statements, where Notes is interpreted in terms of existing
technologies. It is also explicit in the following comments by two managers attempting to explain
why technology in general (and by implication, Notes as well) would not be useful given their
particular modes of working:
My workstyle is heavily interpersonal and oral. So far computers have not really saved me time. I am
not interested in doing all that protocol stuff to get access. I don't want to deal with a programmer's
conception of the world. If I wanted to be a programmer, I would have become one. I approach Notes
with the attitude "Do I really need this?" Other folks are more trained in computers and analytic
methods, and don't have the black box mentality that I do. They tend to work quantitatively rather than
textually or with narrative. And they tend to work in black and white while I work in greys.... These
perceptions cloud how you see things like Notes. I see computers as black and white, and so as not
really suitable to my work.
I'm much more of a people or words person than a numbers person. My feeling is that computers are
more of a numbers technology than a words technology. I don't use computers. I write most of my
memos to my clients by hand, in writing. I think it's more informal, more personal, and I mail it out
that way. I have a computer but I don't use it.
The next comment, by a senior manager, reflects the expectation that use of Notes would detract
from the advantage he has in face-to-face interaction:
Face-to-face interaction is the most important mode of communication for me. I do very little written
communication unless it is a product such as a research report or there's a need to memorialize it. I
prefer to do things face to face anyway as I think it is more effective. I have a very strong physical
presence as you can see.
Finally, a manager noted how Notes reminded him of an earlier unpleasant experience he had had
with technology:
I don't know much about Notes, but it is coming from the top down. I found out today that it is
mouse-driven [makes a face]. There's something about a mouse that I believe is inefficient. I took a
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course in [name of company-specific system]. It was mouse driven. What drove me crazy was the hand-
eye coordination -- I just didn't have it. It also reminds me of a video game and so it annoys me.
Thus, users related Notes to computers in general, to particular aspects of the computer
(e.g., the mouse interface), to specific computer applications they were already familiar with (e.g.,
spreadsheets, word processing, electronic mail, files, and video games), or in contrast to other
communication media (e.g., oral and face to face). Such a reference logic led to ambiguous,
incorrect, or partial images of Notes that are incongruent with those envisioned by technologists
(see Table 2 for contrast).
Technology Strategy
The lack of formal communication about and articulation of the Notes product, resulted in
users having either a simple understanding of the Notes strategy or being highly skeptical of its
potential. In the former case were those users who had interpreted Notes as a personal productivity
tool akin to their spreadsheet or word processor. Such users interpreted the rationale for Notes in
terms of improvements in their personal efficiency. That is, they saw it as an incremental change in
the firm's business, as a few managers commented:
The general perception of Notes is that it is an efficient tool, making what we do now better. But it is
not viewed by the organization as a major change.
I think [Notes] will reduce the time of gathering information. I think it will cut down on frustration in
transferring information. But it is not a radical change.
Notes will do to fax what fax did to telex, replace it.
I see Notes as a personal communication tool. That is, with a modem and fax applications I can do
work at home or at a client site and use Notes to transfer work back and forth. In the office, instead of
getting my secretary to make twenty copies of a memo she can just push a button.
Other users however, were skeptical of the value of the Notes technology, both for their personal
work and that of the firm's operations. This is evident in these observations by principals:
I don't believe that Notes will help our business that much, unless all of our business is information
transfer. It's not. Business is based on relationships. Ideas are created in non-work situations, socially,
over lunch, etc.
I don't think Notes will have an impact on clients--clients have to have confidence in the people, in
their professionalism. Technology should not make a difference here.
But some [of us] are skeptical. ... I have [heard that] there is no value in information technology -- so
you can imagine how I feel!
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Table 2: Contrasting Technologists' and Users' Technological Frames around the Notes Technology
DOMAIN TECHNOLOGISTS USERS
Nature of Focus on technological capabilities in Misunderstanding or confusion about the
Technology isolation, without reference to specific technology
uses in particular contexts "I know nothing about it."
"I knew in an hour that it was a breakthrough "I still don't know what it is"
product, a revolution. I played with it for just two
days and was really ipressed." "I am not very clear about what it is exactly"days and was really impressed."
Value of technology seen as obvious, Interpreting new technology in terms of old
hence formal assessment, justification, "I believe Notes is putting word processing power into
or implementation plan not required spreadsheets."
"But if you believe that Notes is a competitive "Is it a new version of 1-2-3?"
technology you have to ... put it in the hands of "It's big email"
the users asfast as possible." Comparing to computers in general
"The faster we could get to critical mass, thehsooner people would ue it." criticalmassthe "I see computers as black and white, and so as not
sooner people would use it."
_____________ _ _  ___ ~really suitable to my work."
Technology Motivation for technology adoption Motivation for technology adoption seen as
Strategy envisioned in terms of major changes in facilitating incremental changes to the firm
the way of doing business "... it is an efficient tool, making what we do now
e.g., "Notes gives us a competitive advantage ..." better. But it is not viewed by the organization as a
* Motivation 'We want to transform the way we deliver service" major change.
"Notes will do to fax what fax did to telex, replace it."Technical criteria of success, focused on
* Criteria of deployment Technology viewed with skepticism
Success
"uccess'One measure of success is that we have 6000 "But some [of us] are skeptical. . ... I have heard that]
users and 100 servers worldwide." there is no value in information technology -- so you
"Indicators of success? That we need to add canimaginehowfeel!"
resources." "I don't believe that Notes will help our business that
"We've deployed 7000 copies in two years. I much, unless all our business is information transfer.
think we have done very well."
Business criteria of success
"... increased fees or brought in new clients."
"... added to our competitive advantage."
Technology Installation is critical, hence it is the Lack of training seen as an inhibitor to
in Use primary focus understanding and using technology
"[The technologists] focus in life is to keep it "If I had more formal training, the product might be
e.g., going. ... So they are purely focused on the more useful."
* Priorities and technical implementation." 'Training here is so basic it doesn't tell you much."
Resources Users will learn to use the technology Lack of understanding seen as an inhibitor
on their own to using the technology
* Training "Notes does not require formal end user training. "It's no good just putting the technology on our
* Ease-of-Use So we minimized training to reduce the period of desks. You have to show us practical applications,
trial. We didn't want them [the users] to think something with real value to my work."
* Policies for they had to learn to use Notes."
Security, Users will build their own applications Concerned about confidentiality and securityUsers will build their own applications of data iD the databases
Quality, etc. "Application development is so easy, the average "We need to worry about who is seeing te data."
Joe can build his own applications."
Joe can build his own apc"I have concer s about what goes into the databases
"People are smart, they'llfigure out what to do." and who has access to them and what access they
Technology does not raise any new have."
issues about the confidentiality, Concerned about data quality, personal
security, or quality of data liability, and control over data in databases
"Client confidentiality is a cultural value for our "I would be careful what I put out on Notes though. I
firm, so those norms will be extended to Notes." like to retain personal control so that when people
"As for the problem of obsolescence, if they the call me I can tell them not to use it for such and such.
users] don't know it by now it is not my job to But there is no such control within Notes."
tell them. These are not new issues. We have the "I'd be more fearful that I'd put something out there [in
same issues with paper." a Notes database] and it was wrong and somebody
would catch it."
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I don't see it as a means of communication in the office. I sit within 20 feet of my group so I don't
need electronic communication. If I want to communicate with my people, I have five ways to do so:
(1) yell; (2) see them face-to-face; (3) write a note on paper; (4) send voice mail (this is the easiest as I
don't have to write); and (5) use Notes. If I had to rank them, I'd always put Notes as number 5.
I am afraid that [Notes] will slow things down. I can't type as fast as I can talk. I dictate a lot. Also it
doesn't have the same portability. I can call in to voicemail from the phone in a hotel room -- even
from the bathroom. PCs are too heavy to lug around. I only have to take my finger with me to use
voicemail when traveling.
and managers:
A lot of people's main business is not sharing information. And because they are not dependent on it
[Notes] for their work, they won't use it for other purposes.
I'm skeptical about the successful use of Notes. We're not as close as we think we are. We've
committed the financial resources but that's all so far. We're not going to make sure everyone in the
office has 15 hours over next year to spend time learning it. And if they expect us to take it out of our
own time I'm not going to invest that time. I have another life too.
One manager's skepticism of firm-wide use of Notes reflected his belief that principals would not
use it. He noted, "They're still afraid to use computers," and then related a popular stereotype of
principals in the finmn:
The most important criterion of advancement from the senior manager level to principal level is if you
don't know how to turn your computer on.
With respect to how users would measure the effectiveness of the Notes technology, most
cited business criteria. For example,
Criteria for success here is how much money you bring into the firm. Does Notes help that? At lower
levels it's more chargeable hours and working on more important clients.
I can't say [Notes] has increased fees or brought in new clients.
I would like to know how [Notes] has added to our competitive advantage.
I would try to see if [Notes] reduced my work load.
Unlike the technologists, the users' understanding of the motivation behind the technology
and the criteria of its success were internally consistent, that is, related to improving their and their
firm's performance. However, the users' assessment of the strategy behind the adoption of Notes
contrasted markedly with that of the technologists (see Table 2 for contrast).
Technology-in-Use
While consultants began to use the Notes technology, they largely used it for
communicating via electronic mail. The users believed that the education and training on Notes had
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been poor or inadequate. For example, on being asked what she though of the Notes training, one
administrator screwed her eyes up and grabbed her nose with thumb and forefinger in a gesture of
displeasure, noting:
Computer training here is awful. It really is. I wish you would come to see for yourself how bad it is.
I'm a reasonably smart person but they [the technology support staff] make things so complicated. It
really is not very helpful.
Users also believed that they lacked the necessary knowledge to use and explore Notes effectively:
If I had more formal training, the product [Notes] might be more useful.
Training here is so basic it doesn't tell you much. It showed me how to look at my mail and send
messages.
I think the Notes training must become much more directed: what one of my colleagues calls "Day in
the life of ..." training. This type of training should emphasize what a consulting manager typically
does during the day and how Notes can help the manager do it better and more quickly.
Related to inadequate training, was the lack of understanding of what the technology was useful
for. Where the nature of a technology is poorly understood, and in the absence of a clear directive
on how to use it, users found it difficult to know how to appropriate the technology and use it
effectively. They were also less likely to be motivated to do so. For example, consider these
managers' comments:
I have no great need for Notes. I don't know what it can do for me.
We are so task oriented, we are not going to think of applications and creative uses. It's no good just
putting the technology on our desks, you have to show us practical applications, something with real
value to my work.
For me to use Notes I need a better understanding of the applications and their value. I am not willing
to invest a lot of time to create or use applications. It's been a terrible year--I've clocked 600 hours of
overtime. I'm tired. I don't have time to worry about Notes.
and these comments by two principals:
I have not looked at the Notes books [manuals] yet. Other than mail it is unclear to me what I should
use Notes for. I wouldn't look through the databases. I looked at the folders and wondered what I should
call them. I am hoping I will get a better idea of how I can use it from the books.
I don't know 2% of the power of Notes. [The principals in this group] have talked about Notes. We are
not sure what it can do yet so how can we decide how to utilize it? Now we are using it as a typewriter.
Further, in contrast to the technologists' view that existing policies and procedures around
security, confidentiality, and quality were adequate, users had reservations about using Notes
databases. Principals in particular were concerned about threats to security, confidentiality, and
authenticity:
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Security is a concern for me. Databases will have all the people in our group--their names,
compensation, career path, reviews, etc., all very confidential material. ... So there should be
prohibitions on information access.
We need to worry about who is seeing the data. ... Managers should not be able to access all the
information even if it is useful [such as] financial information to clients, because they leave and may
go and work for competitors.
"I have concerns about what goes into the databases and who has access to them and what access they
have."
The flip side of using Notes to share information is the risk of breaking confidentiality of clients, or
undermining the value of special projects. No one would trust the security controls even if they were
imposed. There are no guarantees that those who access the information will keep it confidential.
Managers and senior consultants, in turn, were anxious about data quality, personal liability, and
embarrassment, as evident in these comments:
I would be careful what I put out on Notes though. I like to retain personal control so that when people call
me I can tell them not to use it for such and such. But there is no such control within Notes.
My other concern is that information changes a lot. So if I put out a memo saying X today and then have a
new memo two weeks later, the person accessing the information may not know about the second memo
which had canceled the first. Also if you had a personal discussion you could explain the caveats and the
interpretations and how they should and shouldn't use the information.
"I'd be more fearful that I'd put something out there [in a Notes database] and it was wrong and somebody
would catch it."
I would be concerned in using Notes that I would come to the wrong conclusion and others would see it.
What would make me worry is that it was public information and people were using it and what if it was
wrong? I would not want to be cited by someone who hasn't talked to me first. I'm worried that my
information would be misconstrued and it would end up in Wichita, Kansas "... as per J. Doe in New York"
being used and relied on. You should be able to limit what access people have to what information,
particularly if it is your information. I would definitely want to know who was looking at it.
Apart from the security concerns, I would want to know if Notes databases were subpoenable. That's scary
if our research opinions could be used in malpractice suits.
The users' frame of Notes-in-use -- that it is difficult and time-consuming to learn and use,
and that it raise concerns of control, confidentiality, security, and liability -- is reflected in their
use. The users did not actively or significantly utilize discussion databases in their initial use of
Notes. Some users found benefit in electronic mail and file transfer, but the majority of users (at
least at the time of this study) were not engaging in expertise sharing and collaboration.
In these assumptions about Notes and its context of use, it is apparent that for the Alpha
users, technology was a means to an end. Their primary focus was on client service and on
consulting activities. They work to tight project schedules and have to manage a competitive and
uncertain career situation. As a result, they were unwilling to invest time and energy in learning
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and using a technology that provided no apparent and immediate benefit to them. These users'
interpretations of the Notes technology-in-use suggest a focus and range of concerns that
apparently were not deemed problematic by the technologists (see Table 2 for contrast).
Outcomes of Technological Change
While the implementation of Notes within Alpha was completed and organizational
members began to use the technology, the nature and extent of their early use differed from that
expected by the technologists. These differences in technologists' expectations and actions and
those of the users can be traced to the differences evident in the two groups' respective
technological frames. Cognitive incongruence can be found in all three domains discussed above.
Nature of Technology. The technologists had an understanding of Notes and its capabilities
that recognized its broad potential as a platform for information sharing, electronic communication,
document management, and on-line discussions. They understood the power of the tool to support
group work, in contrast to spreadsheet and word processing packages that facilitate individual
work. Users, in contrast, had a more limited understanding of the nature of Notes and the extent of
its capabilities. Most recognized its electronic mail features and its potential to substitute for
existing communication technologies such as fax and telephone. These interpretations however,
framed the technology as an individual productivity tool, rather than a group productivity tool. The
capability of the tool to facilitate group work and collaboration was largely not appreciated by the
users. These different views on the nature and functionality of Notes between technologists and
users shaped different assessments of its value and influenced different responses to it. It is thus
not surprising that at the time of the study, those users utilizing Notes did so in support of their
individual work, while technologists used Notes to support both individual and collective work.
Technology Strategy. The technologists had expected that Notes would "leverage the
expertise of our firm" and "transform the way we deliver service to clients." These expectations
suggest a significant change in the work practices, policies, and norms of the firm, and invoke
anticipation of what is known as a second order change. Such changes "involve shifting to
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radically different assumptions and modes of operation, with the shift reflecting a replacement of
the status quo" (Gash and Orlikowski, 1991:190). In contrast, the changes enacted by the users in
one office of Alpha, suggest that where the Notes technology was used, it was used to substitute
for existing technologies (e.g., fax, express mail, telephone) and to speed up communication flow.
Such a change resembles first order changes, which reinforce the status quo by creating
incremental improvements in established assumptions and modes of operation (Gash and
Orlikowski, 1991). Technologists believed that the strategy behind the Notes acquisition was to
enable fundamental changes in the business practices and culture of the firm, while users believed
the strategy behind Notes was to create incremental improvements in firm communications.
Technology-in-use. Technologists assumed that Notes was an end-user tool that the
professional and well-educated users could learn and use easily and largely on their own. Hence,
they focused on delivering the technology to all the users and keeping it operational. They thus
expected users to adopt Notes, change their work around it, develop innovative applications, and
extend existing confidentiality policies and quality procedures to its use. Users, on the other hand,
lacked the exposure and knowledge to understand the functionality of Notes and its potential to
significantly improve their work or that of the firm's operations. They assumed that because Notes
was a technological change, technologists should demonstrate the benefits of Notes, develop
appropriate training materials, provide business-relevant applications, and design guidelines
around security, liability, confidentiality, and quality.
While users and technologists interpreted Notes quite differently, group members took
action that was consistent with their particular technological frame. To users, Notes was an
individual productivity tool aimed at improving firm communication, while to technologists, Notes
was a different class of product -- a group productivity tool -- that could enable profound changes
in work and interaction. In the first few months of the Notes implementation in one office, some
benefits from the use of Notes were obtained, particularly around use of electronic mail. However,
the incongruence in frames between the technologists and users had also resulted in some
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unanticipated outcomes, such as an initial barrier of skepticism and frustration being created around
Notes and its utility, and the office not realizing the benefits anticipated at the acquisition of Notes.
This study only examined early use of Notes, hence changes in interpretations and actions
around the technology are possible in the future. However, because early interpretations of
technology tend to congeal (Tyre and Orlikowski, forthcoming), the apparent incongruence may be
problematic in the long term, as the cognitive habits formed through initial exposure to the Notes
technology could prove difficult to change later.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMES CONCEPT
In this paper we have proposed the concept of technological frames, and argued that such a
social cognitive perspective on information technology offers a particularly important and
interesting approach to examining and explaining the development, use, and change of information
technology in organizations. We drew on the findings of a research study to apply the concepts of
technological frames and congruence in order to illustrate their explanatory power. We were able to
explain technology change outcomes in this study by referring to the significant differences in key
actors' technological frames. The conceptual framework developed here has important implications
for both the research and practice of information systems.
Research Contributions
We believe that the concept of technological frames extends earlier work on cognitive
structures by focusing on the increasingly salient organizational arena of information technology.
While organizational researchers has examined the role of collective cognitive models in
organizational action, few have studied collective cognitions of technology. Drawing on the
organizational and sociological literatures we have defined technological frames as the core set of
assumptions, expectations, and knowledge of technology that are collectively held by a group or
community. While technological frames are individually held, they are also social phenomena in
that it is the common or mutual understandings that individuals share that undergirds their
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enactment of a social reality. In this way, social cognitions connect to institutional analyses, which
are concerned with the shared, taken-for-granted systems of social rules and conventions that
structure social thought and action (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 9). A focus on the social nature
of technological frames allows us to ask a number of useful questions about collective
interpretations of technology, such as: what frames do particular groups of individuals share, why,
and with what consequences?; how are these shared understandings formed, reinforced,
institutionalized, and changed over time?; what is the underlying process of such cognitive
formation, stagnation, and modification?; and how do shared frames of a group get embedded in
technology designs and work routines, and with what consequences for particular contexts of use?
We believe that the concept of technological frames is a particularly useful analytic tool for
examining how and why people act around information technology. In particular, this concept
allows us to explain and anticipate outcomes around technology that are not captured by other
perspectives, such as political or structural contingency models. For example, while a political
perspective may explain particular outcomes around new technology due to certain groups'
loss/gain of power, it cannot explain contradictory outcomes due to different interpretations of a
technology. For example, in the Alpha case above, users and technology conceived of Notes
differently. Users' appropriation of Notes as an individual productivity tool stemmed from their
interpretation of Notes as similar to other technologies with which they were familiar --
spreadsheets and voice mail. Technologists, in contrast, understood Notes to be capable of
facilitating their group interaction, hence they appropriated it as a group productivity tool. In this
case, frames provided a valuable lens through which to understand the interpretive grounds for
human action around technology. The concept of technological frames thus forms a powerful and
useful complement to other forms of social analyses, such as power, control, and resource
dependency (Gash, 1987; Grudin, 1988; Kling and Iacono, 1984; Markus, 1983). In an overall
investigation of technology implementation and use in organizations, we believe that both
interpretive analysis of technology frames and institutional analyses of structural, cultural, and
political issues are valuable. For example, the detailed analysis of Alpha (Orlikowski, 1992b)
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included an examination of the institutional elements (such as reward systems, career paths, and
work processes) that constituted the context within which Notes was introduced and used.
In this paper, we have focused on the contributions offered by the concept of technological
frames as we believe it provides a powerful tool for analyzing interpretations and actions around
technology -- a tool that has largely been missing from our lexicon of thinking about and studying
information technology in organizations. Technological frames, as well as the notions of frame
inconsistency and frame incongruence, offer a way of explaining and anticipating actions and
outcomes around information technology not available through perspectives focusing solely on the
structural aspects of organizations.
Examining peoples' shared cognitions around technology can be a powerful means of
articulating and tracing the influence of information systems in organizations. To date, it would
appear that contributions of cognitive researchers have been primarily limited to understanding
individual cognitive processes such as learning, problem-solving, and knowledge representation in
artificial intelligence research, and issues around human factors such as visual and linguistic
interfaces. Our framework which focuses on the influence of shared frames suggests a potentially
broader role for cognitive research in studying information systems. It also allows us to trace the
often-unacknowledged structural influences of shared interpretations. Over time, the assumptions
and categories of shared cognitive structures are often externalized and institutionalized through
being embedded in organizational practices, routines, rituals, and programs (Giddens, 1984;
Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck 1976, 1977; March and Simon 1958; Schein, 1985). Once
institutionalized this way, frames tend to produce cognitive inertia--a conservatism which may
protect the organizational status quo from turbulence and information overload, but which may also
prevent an organization from adapting to changing environmental contingencies. Technologists'
frames typically become built into the artifact they design and construct (Orlikowski, 1992a), as
when technologists' assumptions and vocabulary interpret users' requirements and drive the design
process (Boland, 1979; Markus and Bjorn-Andersen, 1987). These artifacts then shape the
formation of users' frames as they attempt to appropriate that technology in a particular context of
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use (Orlikowski, 1992a). Users' frames, in turn, become routinized and embedded in taken-for-
granted mental and behavioral habits. The institutionalizing influence of shared technological
interpretations over time has largely been unexplored within information systems research. The
concept of technological frames can help us investigate it.
Because the concept of frames is a process rather than a variance theory, it is particularly
valuable in examining the changes associated with implementation of a new technology over time.7
Social cognitive research has recognized that mental models are particularly salient sense-making
devices during processes of organizational change (Bartunek and Moch, 1987; Isabella 1990;
Starbuck 1989; Van Maanen and Schein 1979). Likewise, technological frames may be used to
track changes in the meanings people ascribe to information technology over time, hence providing
a way of investigating the processes and outcomes of organizational change around information
technology (Gash and Orlikowski, 1991). Building on the work of Greenwood and Hinings
(1988), we propose that technological frames may be used to track both expectations of
technological change as well as experiences of technological change throughout the technology
change process. Because such an approach would examine change as anticipated, interpreted, and
experienced by different organizational players, both intended as well as unintended changes
around new technology can be studied. Through such a process view of technological
implementation and use, the complexities, subtleties, and dynamics of technological change can be
addressed in a manner not possible with variance theories.
Implications for Future Research
Our research study has identified an initial set of domains for technological frames that can
serve as the basis for future work in this area. These domains provide guidelines for examining
and articulating people's interpretive relations with technology. Three domains of technological
frames--nature of technology, technology strategy, and technology in use--appeared to be relevant
in the context of a consulting firm implementing a groupware technology. While we believe that
7 For a detailed discussion of the differences between process and variance theories see Markus and Robey (1988).
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these domains are relatively general and likely apply to a diversity of situations, much will be
learned by examining them in other organizational contexts and with other technologies. We also
expect that further empirical investigations will elaborate the domains of technological frames,
adding both domains that apply to technology in general and those that reflect particular kinds of
technologies and specific institutional contexts of use.
Research is also needed to identify the means through which frames around information
technology become shared or divergent, and to examine areas of incongruence among the frames
of key and associated actors. For example, it would be useful to assess how much difference in
assumptions, knowledge, and expectations constitutes frame incongruence, and whether the notion
of incongruence varies by context and time. Research studies might focus on determining the
conditions that lead to increased or decreased congruence in frames, and elaborating the different
organizational consequences that are usually associated with varying degrees of frame
incongruence.
Assessing and recognizing incongruence may be particularly difficult when frames differ
on only some domains, when frames include considerable ambiguity and inconsistency, and when
frames are particularly difficult to articulate. Additionally, research may examine the degree of
tolerance or rigidity of frames with respect to new and possibly contradictory information, the
extent of commitment by various participants to particular frames, and how frames reflect or
deviate from organizational realities (Schwartz, 1990). The process view of frames also requires an
examination of the conditions under which frames change. For example, identifying the internal
and external triggers that typically serve as catalysts for frame changes in various situations is an
important area of study, as is determining how effective various triggers are in accomplishing
changes in people's frames and how these lead to changes in action (Louis and Sutton, 1991).
Assessing incongruence and inconsistency in frames and eliciting deeply-held assumptions,
expectations, and knowledge poses a number of methodological challenges. We believe there are a
variety of methodological approaches amenable to the study of technological frames and frame
incongruence across groups. For example, particular kinds of interviewing techniques, such as
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clinical interviewing (Schein, 1987), discourse-based interviewing (Odell, Goswami, and
Herrington, 1983), and focus groups (Krueger, 1988) provide some guidelines for eliciting
assumptions and meanings. Researchers could collect data by directing within-group focus groups
or in-depth interviews that stimulate discussion specifically around meanings of technology and
expectations around its use. Data gathered at interactions between members of multiple groups
(e.g., managers, users, technologists) such as joint application design (JAD) sessions, may
provide good opportunities for observing congruence (or its absence) and diagnosing reasons for
the apparent discrepancies.
Frames are also revealed through the media of action and language, where the former may
be discerned through observation, and the latter through analysis of metaphors, imagery, symbols,
and vocabularies. While we focused primarily on interview data in our discussion above, the
analysis of the data was also informed by a number of visual images that are often difficult to
integrate into journal articles. For example, we had access to training materials such as manuals
and a video, physical data gathered through observing people at work, and actual usage behavior
obtained through accessing the technology available to the users. Analyzing these visual artifacts
can provide important clues as to people's implicit understandings, values, and concerns. For
example, in response to a question about the utility of Notes, a user expressed his view quite
clearly by fetching a cartoon that graphically depicted skepticism about the value of technology in
the workplace.
Another important consideration is determining how to best analyze the data. We posit that
content analysis of qualitative data is a viable method for "reading between the lines" of data to
assess underlying assumptions and expectations, much as culture researchers interpret manifest
artifacts, symbols and stories. Researchers might begin by coding the content of their interviews,
focus group transcriptions, and observations in terms of the three domains we have proposed here
(Eisenhardt, 1988). Such analysis would reveal whether new categories are needed, and if
sufficient evidence for categories is found they can be examined for the underlying domain they
reflect. Frames may then be examined for internal consistency (using where feasible some form of
36
reliability statistics), and for congruence across groups (e.g., by clustering common domains and
determining divergence). The coding, categorization, and interpretation of data by researchers may
also be strengthened by being validated directly with sources. In fact, such an exercise may serve
to facilitate further discussion, reflection, and articulation of assumptions, meanings, and
experiences.
Implications for Practice
Early articulation, reflection, discussion, negotiation, and possibly change of the identified
inconsistencies and incongruences may reduce the likelihood of unintended misunderstandings and
delusions around the implementation and use of a new information technology. Attempts to surface
the common assumptions, expectations, and knowledge people have of technology can be
particularly useful before the design and implementation of a system, to identify where and why
key stakeholder groups' are incongruent, and where and why particular frames may be internally
inconsistent. We saw from the field study how domains of people's frames were both incongruent
across two key groups, but were also internally inconsistent within one of the groups. This
inconsistency and incongruence led to certain action and inaction that hampered the implementation
of a new technology. Early identification of these inconsistencies and in congruencies may have
avoided some of the difficulties experienced during the implementation.
Our conceptualization of technological frames also provides a means for influencing
groups' frames as the technology development and implementation process proceeds. Initial
assessment or benchmarking of frames will indicate the degree to which participants share an
understanding of the organizational changes intended by a new technology. Tracking groups'
frames over time provides practitioners with insight into the underlying reasons for different
conceptions and actions by key stakeholders. It may also provide insight into the source of the
incongruence and hence the nature of appropriate interventions. Different types of incongruences
should likely be treated differently. That is, distinguishing between incongruences due to political
differences and those due to information deficiencies would allow for developing specific
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interventions that dealt with the particular difference at hand. Specific data about the sources of
incongruence or inconsistency around a technological change may be used to design a number of
interventions to attempt clarification or alignment of people's understanding, including reframing
the change effort. For example, Bartunek (1984) notes how a school principal -- realizing the
political concerns of the teachers -- was able to effectively introduce microcomputers by reframing
the desired change as a more acceptable incremental change to the curriculum (computers as a
learning aid) rather than as the more radical and threatening change initially anticipated by the
teachers.
Technological frames also have implications for the practice of information systems
development itself. In their design and construction of information systems, technologists have
tended to rely on structured methodologies to elicit information requirements from managers and
users. Traditionally these methodologies have paid little attention to technologists' assumptions,
expectations, and knowledge, and how these may differ from the frames of managers and users for
whom the technology is being built. Some of the techniques of frame articulation and assessment
mentioned above might usefully be applied to technologists, so as to track the degree to which their
interpretations of the technology and associated organizational changes relate to those of other
stakeholders. These techniques would be particularly important in the case of external systems
consultants as they have no common organizational context with their clients, hence congruence in
frames may be even more difficult to accomplish.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed the concept of technological frames and suggested that
people's technological frames influence their action towards technology. We further posited that
technological frames are shared by members of a group having a particular interaction with some
technology. We defined the notion of frame incongruence and suggested that different groups may
have incongruent technological frames, which could lead to difficulties around technological use
and change. Different technological frames imply different ways of knowing and making sense of
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technology. As these different interpretations are typically not articulated or discussed, they may,
as we saw in the case of the Notes implementation, result unintendedly and unknowingly in
misaligned expectations (such as technologists intending improvements in group work while users
perceive improvements in individual productivity), contradictory actions (such as technologists
installing and operating a technology while users wait for training and applications), and
unanticipated organizational consequences (such as resistance, skepticism, and spotty adoption).
By articulating the interaction between shared interpretations, social action, and
technological artifacts within an organizational context, technological frames offer a number of
theoretical and practical contributions. We believe that the concept of technological frames and the
broad domains of technological frames proposed here are a useful starting point for examining key
actors' interpretations of technology, and the nature and extent of difference among them. We also
believe that the framework of technological frames has utility for the diagnosis, explanation, and
anticipation of outcomes around technological change in organizations, and hence may be
particularly useful to implementors and practitioners attempting to manage such change processes.
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